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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 28, 2018, Palestine lodged a complaint at the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) against the United States, arguing that the latter’s shifting of its Israeli embassy to Jerusalem violates the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (VCDR)1 and it should be shifted.2 This article seeks to
address the legal issues that may arise before the ICJ in this case. This article,
not being an amicus curiae brief or advocacy piece, seeks to engage in academic discourse on the issues and not argue for or against the case of the disputing parties. While this is an issue where realpolitik may well be intrinsically connected with the law, the former is by no means the focus of the article
and is only looked into when otherwise inevitable.
President Trump’s decision to move the embassy aligns him with the position taken by U.S. Congress with the passing of Jerusalem Embassy Act in
1995 (EA).3 However, although the EA required the U.S. executive branch to
shift the embassy to Jerusalem, it provided the President with an option to
seek a waiver, which presidents preceding President Trump persistently
availed.4 The prior presidents also argued the power of recognition is a purely
executive matter, an argument that the U.S. Supreme Court accepted in Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky).5 President Trump, however, opted to deviate from
the position of his predecessors and finally moved the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem on May 14, 2018.6
This relocation is critical for Palestine because if other states follow the
U.S.’s decision to relocate, it could gradually lead to an international

1
See generally, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T.
3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
2
Press Release, I.C.J., The State of Palestine Institutes Proceedings against the United
States of America, I.C.J. Press Release No. 2018/47 (Sept. 28, 2018).
3
Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-45, Nov. 8, 1995, 109 Stat. 398.
4
Stephen Farrell, Why is the U.S. Moving its Embassy to Jerusalem?, REUTERS (May
7, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-israel-diplomacy-jerusalem-explai/whyis-the-u-s-moving-its-embassy-to-jerusalem-idUSKBN1I811N.
5
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2081 (2015). Zivotofsky, who was born in Jerusalem, wanted to have his place of birth on his passport to be Israel. As the executive
branch did not recognize any country’s sovereignty over Jerusalem, his birthplace on his
passport was listed as “Jerusalem.” The Court determined that by passing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act in 2002, which entitled persons born in Jerusalem to have Israel
listed as their place of birth, Congress usurped the President’s executive power to recognize
foreign states.
6
Alexandra Ma, Trump Has Officially Moved the US Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem—
and More than 58 Palestinians Are Dead in Protests, BUS. INSIDER (May 14, 2018), https://
www.businessinsider.com/us-embassy-officially-moves-to-jerusalem-palestinians-die-inprotests-2018-5.
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recognition that undivided Jerusalem falls within Israel’s territories.7 This
may undermine Palestine’s effort to establish a state in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital, which Palestine has sought to
do consistently for quite some time.8 This prospect holds despite a disclaimer
in the declaration by President Trump in December 2017, stating that the
“United States continues to take no position on any final status issues. The
specific boundaries of Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem are subject to final status negotiations between the parties. The United States is not taking a position
on boundaries or borders.”9 This move by President Trump is also a clear reversal from the former position of the United States, as evident from the U.S.
Secretary of State’s position quoted in the D.C. Circuit’s judgment in Zivotofsky that:
Any unilateral action by the United States that would signal,
symbolically or concretely, that it recognizes that Jerusalem is
a city that is located within the sovereign territory of Israel
would critically compromise the ability of the United States to
work with Israelis, Palestinians and others in the region to further the peace process.10
As I noted last year, President Trump’s “decision to relocate the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem is an unequivocal recognition of Israel’s
claim to the united city of Jerusalem.”11 In addition, I noted that “to imply that
by doing this, the U[.]S[.] has not taken any decision on boundaries or borders” seems unpersuasive.12 The discussion that follows first chronicles the
procedural developments in the case so far. It then surmises the legal effect of
potential non-appearance of the United States in this case, the locus standi of
Palestine for filing this case, the compliance of United States’ action with the
VCDR, the issue of the case of affecting the rights of a third party (Israel),
and the justiciability of political questions by the ICJ. The article concludes
by arguing that while Palestine’s case is likely to face some substantial hurdles

7
Md. Rizwanul Islam, Palestine Objects to US Embassy Move at ICJ, BANGKOK POST
(Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/1553566/palestine-objectsto-us-embassy-move-at-icj.
8
Id. See also Press Release, General Assembly, As General Assembly Debates
Question of Palestine, Members Call for Swift Action to Jump-Start Israeli-Palestinian Talks, Realize Two-State Solution, U.N. Press Release GA/12095 (Nov. 29,
2018).
9
Pres. Proc. No. 9683, 82 Fed. Reg. 58331 (Dec. 11, 2017).
10
Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 725 F.3d 197, 217 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
11
Islam, supra note 7.
12
Id.
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at a procedural level, the case seems to be a persuasive one at a substantive
level.
II. PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS
On a procedural level, it is important to note that in a letter communicated
to the Registry of the ICJ, the United States indicated a belief that it does not
stand in a treaty relationship with Palestine with regard to either the VCDR or
its Optional Protocol (OP).13 On October 3, 2018, the United States also withdrew from the OP.14 For these reasons, the United States requested the ICJ to
take the case off its Registry.15 Palestine, on the other hand, asked that the
Court decide the issues of jurisdiction and of merit together.16 The ICJ decided
that it would first decide on the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility
of the application.17 The jurisdiction of the ICJ is decided on the basis of the
date when the Court is seised of the matter and events subsequent to that
would have no effect on jurisdiction of the Court unless “events occurring
subsequent to the filing of an application may render the application without
object such that the Court is not called upon to give a decision . . . .”18 This
would be so even if the matter arguably becomes factually moot as the Court
decided in Congo v Belgium.19 In that case, Belgian parliament implemented
law of universal jurisdiction and subsequently, Belgium issued an arrest warrant against Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo for racially hateful speech.20 Congo
alleged that this was a violation of customary international law of immunities.21 When the case was decided, Yeorida held no ministerial position and
thus, Belgium argued that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction because the matter had
become moot.22 However, the ICJ rejected this claim, as the Court found that
since Congo alleged the invalidity of the warrant of arrest and Belgium
13
Relocation of the United States Embassy to Jerusalem (Palestine v. U.S.), Order, ICJ
General List No. 176 (Nov. 15) [hereinafter Order of November 15]. See generally Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 487.
14
Raberta Rampton, Lesley Wroughton, & Stephanie van den Berg, U.S. Withdraws
from International Accords, Says U.N. World Court ‘Politicized’, REUTERS, (Oct. 3, 2018),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-diplomacy-treaty-idUSKCN1MD2CP.
15
Order of November 15, supra note 13.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J.
Rep. 3 (Feb. 14), at ¶ 32.
19
Id.
20
Id. at ¶¶ 13-15.
21
Id. at ¶ 21.
22
Id. at ¶ 18.
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defended it, the object of the dispute subsisted, despite factual changes in the
events.23 Thus, it may be argued that had the ICJ possessed jurisdiction in the
matter before the United States’ withdrawal from the OP, it would continue
to possess the jurisdiction notwithstanding the withdrawal.
The ICJ fixed May 15, 2019 as the deadline for Palestine to submit its
memorial and November 15, 2019 as the deadline for the United States to
submit its counter-memorial.24 Given the United States’ assertion denying the
jurisdiction of the ICJ and non-appointment of an agent before the Court’s
order on November 15, 2018, it is unclear as to whether the United States
would submit a counter-memorial and take part in further proceedings of the
Court at all. Since the Palestinians exchanged a note verbale on July 4, 2018
with the U.S. Department of State about this matter,25 it is a little curious why
the United States did not withdraw from the OP before the filing of the Palestinian Case at the ICJ. A plausible explanation for this is that the U.S. government did not foresee Palestine bringing a case to the ICJ about this.
III. THE EFFECT OF POTENTIAL NON-APPEARANCE OF THE USA
The consequence of non-appearance before the ICJ is addressed in Article
53(1) of the ICJ Statute.26 This provides when a party to a dispute before it
does not appear or defend its case, the other party may petition that the Court
decides the case in its favor.27 However, it is incumbent on the Court that
before it does so, it is satisfied that there is ICJ jurisdiction over the matter
and that the case is well-founded in fact and law.28 Thus, Article 53 protects
the non-appearing party from unfounded claims upheld against it, which differs from many municipal legal systems where the courts may pass default
judgement relatively easily against a non-appearing party.29
As a matter of law, even though the United States has not yet appeared
before the ICJ, for jurisdiction purposes, the United States has become a party
to the case and the ICJ may proceed to decide it. The support for this proposition may be found in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case30 observing:
23

Id. at ¶ 32.
Order of November 15, supra note 13.
25
Relocation of the United States Embassy to Jerusalem (Palestine v. U.S.), Application
Instituting Proceedings, General List No. 176, ¶ 35, (Sept. 28) [hereinafter Palestine Instituting Proceedings].
26
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 53(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
33 U.N.T.S. 93 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
27
Id.
28
Id. at art. 53(2).
29
See infra note 39 and the accompanying text.
30
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (July 25)
[hereinafter Fisheries Jurisdiction].
24
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It is to be regretted that the Government of Iceland has failed
to appear in order to plead its objections . . . . The Court however, as an international judicial organ, is deemed to take judicial notice of international law, and is therefore required in a
case falling under Article 53 of the Statute, as in any other
case, . . . to consider on its own initiative all rules of international law which may be relevant to the settlement of the dispute. It being the duty of the Court itself to ascertain and apply
the relevant law in the given circumstances of the case, the
burden of establishing or proving rules of international law
cannot be imposed upon any of the parties, for the law lies
within the judicial knowledge of the Court.31
In a similar vein, in the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran, when Iran did not appear at the ICJ to defend the case brought against
it by the United States, the Court regretted the former’s lack of presentation
but felt that by dint of the settled jurisprudence, it had to apply Article 53 of
the Statute and decide propiro motu the question of admissibility of the application and the question of jurisdiction on the basis of materials before it.32 In
doing this, the Court, inter alia, assessed the letters communicated to it by Iran
to deny jurisdiction.33 When a party does not appear, the appearing party may
enjoy somewhat greater leeway in establishing the facts claimed by it.34 This
is natural because in some way the voice of the non-appearing party would be
missing in the Court. In Corfu Channel, the Court took the view that when a
party does not appear, the Court is under a duty to assess whether or not the

31

Id. at ¶17.
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980
I.C.J. Rep. 18, ¶ 33 (May 24) [hereinafter Diplomatic Staff in Tehran].
33
Id.
34
The following paragraph of the dissenting opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings in
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment,
1986 I.C.J. 528, 544 (June 27), eloquently explaining the point:
One is bound to observe that here, where questions of fact may be every
bit as important as the law, the United States can hardly complain at the
inevitable consequences of its failure to plead during the substantive
phase of the case. It is true that a great volume of material about the facts
was provided to the Court by the United States during the earlier phases
of the case. Yet a party which fails at the material stage to appear and
expound and explain even the material that it has already provided, inevitably prejudices the appreciation and assessment of the facts of the case.
There are limits to what the Court can do, in accordance with Article 53
of the Statute, to satisfy itself about a non-appearing party’s case; and
that is especially so where the facts are crucial.
32

2019]

THE CASE OF PALESTINE AGAINST THE USA AT THE ICJ

7

case filed is well-founded.35 However, the duty obliges the Court to assess
their accuracy in all details. Underscoring the impracticability of such rigorous scrutiny in some situations, the ICJ decided “[i]t is sufficient for the Court
to convince itself by such methods as it considers suitable that the submissions
are well founded.”36
The above, of course, does not mean that the Court is only limited to the
materials presented to it by the appearing party and any communication presented by the non-appearing party. The Court may, for instance, rely on matters of public knowledge as it did in Diplomatic Staff in Tehran.37 The Court
may also appoint external experts as it did in Corfu Channel.38 However, in
relying on these sources, the Court has to be cognizant that it does not somehow end up doing what the absent party had to. The ICJ explained in Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua Case) that
“[t]he intention of Article 53 was that in a case of non-appearance neither
party should be placed at a disadvantage; therefore the party which declines
to appear cannot be permitted to profit from its absence . . . .”39 While there
are no specific rules ensuring this, the ICJ in Nicaragua Case simply asserted
that “[t]he treatment to be given by the Court to communications or material
emanating from the absent party must be determined by the weight to be given
to these different considerations.”40 Thus, we are left no wiser on what the
different considerations could be in a particular case. However, in all cases,
the Court is required to determine and apply the relevant rules of international
law, and this is all the more important when one of the parties would not appear before it.41
International law is still based on the consent of states. Starting with the
Hague Peace Conferences and the Covenant of the League of Nations and
further bolstered by the Briand Kellogg Pact of 1928, there has been a growing
leaning toward peaceful settlement of international disputes.42 Thus, as a matter of policy, it may be submitted that states should appear before the ICJ to
promote a peaceful resolution of international disputes. The same view is also
consonant with the U.N. Charter and ICJ Statute both of which speak of

35
The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 244, 248 (Dec. 15)
[hereinafter Corfu Channel].
36
Id.
37
Diplomatic Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. Rep at ¶ 12-13.
38
Corfu Chanel, 1949 I.C.J. at 247.
39
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 31 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua Case].
40
Id.
41
U.K. v. Ice., 1974 I.C.J. at 9.
42
General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27,
1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
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peaceful settlement of international disputes.43 At another level, some economically powerful states advocate for greater recourse to international courts
and tribunals in economic matters such as trade and investment.44 At the same
time, they are sometimes recalcitrant to appear in the international courts and
tribunals in matters in which they do not any have strong economic or strategic
incentives to do so45 is somewhat hypocritical. A principled approach to international law would demand that economically strong states would have a
uniform approach in embracing dispute settlement in all areas of international
law, not just in areas where they believe that their economic imperatives suits
resorting to international law.
In light of Article 94 of the U.N. Charter and Articles 59 and 60 of the ICJ
Statute, it is likely that if the ICJ eventually finds jurisdiction and renders a
judgment in favor of Palestine, the United States would likely be bound by
such judgment. However, the judgment’s practical value would be meaningless because, pursuant to Article 94 of the U.N. Charter, the US, as a member
of the U.N. Security Council, can veto down any measure against it.46 In any
event, the Security Council has yet to enforce a judgment by the ICJ.47 That,
of course, in no way diminishes the jurisprudential or moral value of the
Court’s judgments.
IV. IS PALESTINE A STATE OR CAN IT BE A PARTY BEFORE THE ICJ?
Article 34 of the ICJ Statute states that “[o]nly states may be parties in
cases before the Court.”48 Thus, an obviously thorny issue for Palestine to get
this case settled by the ICJ may be to prove that it is a state. It is likely that
the United States would argue that Palestine merely has an observer status in
the United Nations49 and is not yet a state,50 and hence, Palestine does not

43

U.N. Charter arts. 38, 52; ICJ Statute art. 4.
See generally Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Proposals for Strengthening the UN Dispute
Settlement System–Lessons from International Economic Law, 3 MAX PLANCK
YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW (1999).
45
Id.
46
U.N. Charter art. 94.
47
Aloysius P. Llamzon, Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the International Court of Justice, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 815, 822 (2007).
48
ICJ Statute art. 34.
49
Initially, in 1974 it was the Palestine Liberation Organization which was granted the
observer status and it was in 1988 that the U.N. General Assembly changed this to Palestine. See G.A. Res. 43/177 (Dec. 15, 1988). In 1998, the status of Palestine was somewhat
upgraded; it was allowed to take part in the U.N. but not to vote. See G.A. Res. 52/250
(July 7, 1998).
50
John Bolton, the former U.S. National Security Advisor, has been quoted saying that
the “so-called state of Palestine’s move to the ICJ would be blocked.” See Dierdre
44
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qualify as a party before the ICJ. There is a scholarly opinion that the observer
status is not even a springboard to gain eventual statehood.51 On this point,
Palestine’s argument could be based on the non-member observer state status
granted by the U.N. General Assembly through its Resolution 67/19 of November 29, 2012.52 The counterargument to giving a definitive emphasis on
this Resolution would be that it is not the United Nations, rather individual
states who recognize states.53
And if the Court takes the constitutive theory of recognition,54 then the
status of this Resolution could be somewhat diminished. However, in the contemporary era, the recognition of states is generally considered declaratory.55
Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States
did not mention recognition as one of the elements of statehood.56 Article 6 of
the Convention has categorically proclaimed “[t]he recognition of a state
merely signifies that the state which recognizes it accepts the personality of
the other with all the rights and duties determined by international law.”57 In
three of its ten opinions, the Commission set up by the European Economic
Community to arbitrate the orderly dissolution of Yugoslavia also took the
view that the recognition of states is only declaratory.58 However, it is
Shesgreen, Bolton Says U.S. Will Block Legal Challenge from So-Called State of Palestine’
over Embassy Move, USA TODAY (Oct. 3, 2018), www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/20
18/10/03/bolton-blasts-legal-challenge-so-called-state-palestine/1513340002/. For a detailed analysis on the issue of Palestine’s statehood from a general international law point
of view see, e.g., Francis A. Boyle, The Creation of the State of Palestine, 1:1 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 301 (1990); JOHN QUIGLEY, THE STATEHOOD OF PALESTINE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT (Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 2010); cf. James Crawford,
Creation of the State of Palestine: Too Much Too Soon? 1:1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 307 (1990).
51
See, e.g., JAMES. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 195
(Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 2d ed. 2006).
52
G.A. Res. 67/19, ¶ 2 (Nov. 29, 2012) [hereinafter Resolution].
53
SIMON CHESTERMAN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATION: DOCUMENTS
AND COMMENTARY 205 (2d ed. 2016).
54
The proponents of this theory argue that it is only through recognition of a new state
by other states that a new state may gain statehood. This theory is a vestige of the nineteenth
century idea of the European states that they had the right to determine which new states
would be admitted to or be excluded from the family of nations. See ANTONIO CASSESE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 74 (2d ed. 2005).
55
See generally MARTHA J. PETERSON, RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS: LEGAL
DOCTRINE AND STATE PRACTICE, 1815-995 (1997).
56
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 165
L.N.T.S. 19.
57
Id. at art. 6.
58
Opinion No. 1, Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Comm’n, 92 I.L.R. 162, 163
(Nov. 29, 1991); Opinion No. 8, Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Comm’n, 92 I.L.R.
199, 201 (July 4, 1992); Opinion No. 10, Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Comm’n,
92 I.L.R. 206, 208 (July 4, 1992). The advocates of this declaratory theory argue that
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somewhat unlikely that the ICJ would consider the view of the Commission,
as it does not too often refer to the decisions of other international courts or
tribunals which could be driven by an awareness of the Court’s pre-eminent
status as the World Court.59 However, even by the more restrictive of the two
theories of state recognition, the constitutive theory, the fact that as many as
140 states formally recognized Palestine as a state by August 201860 could be
indicative of its statehood. Having said that, the limitation to this approach of
ascertaining Palestine’s statehood could be the myriad of uncertainties about
the territory of Palestine and also the competing claims of governance between Fatah and Hamas.
One point apparent from the Court’s decision in the Construction of a Wall
Advisory Opinion of 2004 (Construction of a Wall) is that, at least until that
point, the Court did not consider Palestine as a state.61 This would be clearly
evident from the following observation:
The Court considers that it has a duty to draw the attention of
the General Assembly, to which the present Opinion is addressed, to the need for these efforts [the Roadmap and other
Security Council resolutions] to be encouraged with a view to
achieving as soon as possible, on the basis of international law,
a negotiated solution to the outstanding problems and the establishment of a Palestinian State, existing side by side with
Israel and its other neighbours, with peace and security for all
in the region.62 [Emphasis added]
By drawing the attention of the U.N. General Assembly for the establishment of the State of Palestine, clearly, the Court expressed the view that at
that point in time, Palestine lacked statehood. This is also interesting to note
recognition is nothing but a formal declaration of an already existing fact. Therefore, recognition is not a precondition of a state’s statehood, instead just a formal declaration of it.
The newly emerged states in the twentieth century tend to support this theory.
59
However, the relative reticence is not any strict rule as the ICJ, in some cases, does
refer to the precedents of other courts and tribunals. See, e.g., Ahmadou Sadio Diallo
(Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Merits, 2010 I.C.J. 639, ¶ 66 (Nov. 30) (“Although the
Court is in no way obligated . . . to model its own interpretation . . . on that of the Committee, it believes that it should ascribe great weight to the interpretation adopted by this independent body . . . to achieve the necessary clarity and the essential consistency of international law . . .”).
60
Colombia Recognises Palestine as Independent State, TRT WORLD (Aug. 9, 2018), ht
tp://www.trtworld.com/americas/colombia-recognises-palestine-as-independent-state-194
63.
61
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 162 (July 9).
62
Id.
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that in declaring the construction of walls in occupied territories illegal, the
Court did not ask Israel to compensate Palestine, but rather the persons affected.63 This is a departure from the Chorzow Factory formula where a state
in breach of an international obligation was to compensate the state to whom
the obligation was owed.64 This is apparent as the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) stated in Chorzow Factory that “the Polish Government is under an obligation to pay, as reparation to the German Government
[not directly to the companies suffering loss], a compensation corresponding
to the damage sustained by the said Companies.”65 Thus, the following observation of the ICJ would also reinforce that it did not consider Palestine as a
state at the time of delivering its opinion:
Israel is accordingly under an obligation to return the land, orchards, olive groves and other immovable property seized
from any natural or legal person for purposes of construction
of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In the event
that such restitution should prove to be materially impossible,
Israel has an obligation to compensate the persons in question
for the damage suffered. The Court considers that Israel also
has an obligation to compensate, in accordance with the applicable rules of international law, all natural or legal persons
having suffered any form of material damage as a result of the
wall’s construction.66
However, it may be argued that the difference between the Construction
of a Wall and the Chorzow Factory is due to the fact that the former is an
advisory opinion and the latter is a judgment in a case filed by Germany seeking remedy against Poland seeking remedy.67 In other words, in the Construction of a Wall, Palestine was not a party to the case, and hence, the ICJ did not
ask Israel to compensate Palestine.68 Again, the practice of the ICJ followed
in the Construction of a Wall connotes that the ICJ viewed Palestine as an
unusual case.69 Article 66 of the ICJ Statute allows only states and international organizations to make submissions before the Court during advisory
63

Id. at ¶¶ 149-153.
Factory at Chorzow, Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 27, at 48 (Sept. 13) [hereinafter Chorzow Factory].
65
Id. at 63.
66
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. at ¶ 153 (emphasis added).
67
Id. at ¶136; Chorzow Factory, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 27.
68
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. 136.
69
See infra notes 70-71 and the accompanying text.
64
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opinion proceedings.70 Despite that, the Court allowed Palestine to make submissions on a footing like the other parties on the basis of Palestine’s observer
status in the U.N. and it being a co-sponsor of the draft resolution seeking
advisory opinion in the case.71 In doing this, the ICJ took a leap beyond the
text of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, because none of the
resolutions deals with the locus standi of Palestine before the Court. Since
Palestine could in no way be an international organization, it may be said that
the Court considered that Palestine was competent to make submissions like
a state.
It is true that there is a gulf of difference between making a submission
before the Court in the course of its advisory opinion hearings and making a
claim against another state in its contentious jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the advisory opinion approach may be an avenue for the ICJ to find jurisdiction
without pronouncing anything definitive on the statehood of Palestine. Or
even if the Court concludes that Palestine is not yet a state, by taking this
relaxed procedural approach, the Court may assume jurisdiction. However,
given the substantial difference between making a claim as a party in a contentious case before the ICJ and making submissions before the Court in the
course of an advisory opinion, the court taking this path seems rather unlikely.
And the clear language of Article 34 of the Statute makes it all the more difficult to hold that any entity other than a state may invoke the contentious
jurisdiction of the ICJ.72
Assuming, arguendo, that Palestine is a state or competent to file a claim
before the Court like states, the next issue for Palestine is whether it can file
a case before the ICJ as a non-member of United Nations. Unlike the prior
issue, this seems to be an easier question. The Palestinian Government invoked Article 35(2) of the Statute of ICJ which provides that “[t]he conditions
under which the Court shall be open to other states [not parties to the Statute]
shall, subject to the special provisions contained in treaties in force, be laid
down by the Security Council.”73 The Security Council Resolution 9 of 15
October 1946 also provides for the conditions of admissibility of claims by
states which are not parties to the ICJ Statute.74 Thus, if the ICJ decides that
Palestine is a state for the purposes of its Statute, then Palestine seems to have
the right to invoke the jurisdiction of the ICJ. In this case, the Court may find
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74
S.C. Res. 9, ¶ 1 (Oct. 15, 1946).
71

2019]

THE CASE OF PALESTINE AGAINST THE USA AT THE ICJ

13

its jurisdiction under Article 1 of the OP to which both Palestine and the U.S.
happen to be contracting parties.75
As per Article 93(2) of the U.N. Charter, states which are not members of
the UN may become parties to the ICJ Statute on conditions to be determined
by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.76
In the past, states like Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and San Marino used this
category before joining the United Nations.77 As already discussed, considering Palestine as an observer state and co-sponsor of the Draft Resolution requesting the Advisory Opinion in Construction of a Wall, the ICJ allowed it
to submit a written statement and to participate in the oral proceedings before
it,78 which may provide a sort of a footing for Palestine to submit its case before the ICJ through this avenue.
V. SETTLING THE CASE WITHOUT DEALING WITH THE QUESTION OF
PALESTINE’S STATEHOOD SUBSTANTIVELY
Another way of dealing with the case without dealing with the question of
Palestine’s statehood as a substantive question of international law could be
that the ICJ may apply a limited procedural test of statehood by resorting to
Article 81 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).79 Article
81 states that the VCLT is open to “signature by all States Members of the
United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies.”80 Since Palestine joined
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), a specialized agency of the United Nations on 23 November 2011
as a member state, it can be argued that it is a state fulfilling the procedural
threshold of bringing a claim before the ICJ.81 If this happens, the ICJ may
decide on the merits of the case by avoiding the thorny question of Palestine’s
statehood as a matter of general international law.
However, some international legal agreements are already open to entities
which are not states, for example, the WTO agreements, which include Hong
75
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, supra note 13, at art. 1.
76
U.N. Charter art. 93(2).
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Rosalyn Cohen, The Concept of Statehood in United Nations Practice, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 1127, 1163 (1961).
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Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong SAR) or Macao as members.82 Although this allows Hong Kong SAR or Macao to be parties to the
WTO treaties and WTO dispute settlement body, it does not mean that the
treaties allow them to be parties before the ICJ. Again, the membership criteria of UNESCO and ICJ Statute are different. Article II: 2 of the UNESCO
Constitution states that:
Subject to the conditions of the Agreement between this Organization and the United Nations Organization… states not
members of the United Nations Organization may be admitted
to membership of the Organization, upon recommendation of
the Executive Board, by a two-thirds majority vote of the General Conference.83
This would imply that the UNESCO Convention takes a more relaxed approach along the line of VCLT’s wider embrace regarding statehood as a condition for membership. On the other hand, the membership criteria of the ICJ
Statute are that a state would either have to be a member of the U.N. or be
especially eligible to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 35(2),
discussed above.84 Hence, it seems unlikely that the ICJ would hold that Palestine’s membership of UNESCO suffices the procedural threshold of being
a state for invoking its jurisdiction in a contentious case.
Support for this line of argument that Palestine may fulfill the procedural
threshold of invoking ICJ’s contentious jurisdiction comes from the ICC Prosecutor’s decision of January 2015 to open the preliminary examination in regard to Palestine’s status observer member state of the United Nations.85 The
official statement explained:
For the Office, the focus of the inquiry into Palestine’s ability
to accede to the Rome Statute has consistently been the question of Palestine’s status in the UN, given the UNSG’s role as
treaty depositary of the Statute. The UNGA Resolution 67/19
is therefore determinative of Palestine’s ability to accede to the

82
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ORG. (June 20, 2019), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.
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Statute pursuant to article 125, and equally, its ability to lodge
an article 12(3) declaration.86
However, regard should be had to the wording of article 12(3) of the Statute of the ICC, which states: “If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party
to this Statute is required . . . that State may, by declaration lodged with the
Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the
crime in question.”87 When we compare this pronouncement in the ICC Statute with the wording in Article 34(1) that “[o]nly states may be parties in cases
before the Court,”88 the contrasting approach seems to be evident. Whereas
Article 34 emphasizes the fact of statehood of a party as a prerequisite for
invoking the contentious jurisdiction, Article 12(3) simply states that a nonparty state may accept the jurisdiction of ICC.89 Article 12(3) relates to matters within “[t]he State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State
of registration of that vessel or aircraft;” or “[t]he State of which the person
accused of the crime is a national.”90 That is to say, Article 12(3) of the Statute
of the ICC relates to matters within the territories of the state that accepts the
jurisdiction, whereas Article 34 of the ICJ Statute does not necessarily have
any such territorial limitation.91 Thus, on the balance, it remains doubtful as
to what extent the ICJ may or should take the identical approach of the ICC.
However, even if in this case, there is a difficulty in treating Palestine as a
state qualified to invoke the contentious jurisdiction of the Court. From a
broader policy point of view, there is a considerable policy reason to interpret
the term ‘state’ more liberally. This has been explained eloquently by Cohen:
A claim to become a party to the Statute of the Court is a claim
to limited participation. A fortiori, this is true of a claim to appear before the Court on a single occasion. The undoubted desirability of having as many states as possible subject to the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court and, reciprocally, with
access to the Court, together with the fact that the claim is of a
limited nature, provide the expectation that in this context the
86
Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, The Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court, Fatou Bensouda, Opens a Preliminary Examination of the Situation in Palestine,
(Jan. 16, 2015) (emphasis added).
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term “state” will be interpreted liberally, that is, will bear a
slightly less distinct relationship to the formal legal criteria of
statehood.92
While there may be some policy reasons, from a point of view interested
in promoting greater recourse to the settlement of disputes through legal
means, in this particular case it is uncertain whether the Court takes a narrow
textual approach or a liberal approach.
VI. THE SHIFTING OF THE U.S. EMBASSY AND VCDR
Palestine acceded to the OP on March 22, 2018.93 On May 1, 2018, the
United States communicated to the Depository of the U.N. that it considers
that the “‘State of Palestine’ is not qualified to accede to the Optional Protocol” and hence, it would “not consider itself to be in a treaty relationship with
the ‘State of Palestine’ under the Optional Protocol.”94 On this particular
point, it seems that neither VCLT nor customary international law provides
any direct guidance as to the consequences of the USA’s assertion. Only this
far may be said with some degree of conviction that the USA’s declaration
cannot, ipso facto, have any implication for Palestine’s rights and obligations
in relation to other parties to the VCDR. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to saying that a treaty party can unilaterally determine the legal status
of accession of another party which is clearly untenable. That would give a
treaty party effectively veto power over a majority of other treaty parties without whose consent the objected state could not have acceded to the treaty in
the first place.
However, to the extent that the United States wants to deny its treaty relationship with Palestine, the answer seems to be that the United States may do
so at its will. The basis of treaty rights and obligations is the consent of the
parties.95 Hence, when a treaty party unequivocally denounces its treaty relationship with another treaty party, it is difficult to see how the two parties can
owe any treaty obligations to each other. Possibly, the only question about the
92
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United States’ position on this could be that since the United States felt that it
was in no treaty relation to Palestine, why, after a short period of Palestine
filing its case at the ICJ, the United States withdrew from the OP. The rationale behind this is unclear, perhaps this far can be said that the United States
simply wanted to stress its lack of interest in participating in the case. Thus, it
may pose a jurisdictional hurdle for Palestine and the case may end here. Had
the United States accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ under the
Optional Clause, i.e., Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute,96 Palestine could potentially (though perhaps only theoretically) have another opening to overcome
the jurisdictional barrier.
Generally, states establish their diplomatic missions in the capital city or
sometimes other town which is the seat of government of the receiving state,
and they tend to follow that government’s seat when it moves either permanently or provisionally.97 However, in exceptional cases, this common practice has not been followed, e.g. in Saudi Arabia, the Foreign Office of the
receiving state was in Jeddah, where foreign missions were required to be located, not in Riyadh, the actual seat of the government.98 This is understandable because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be the natural point of
contact for the embassy. In case of Israel, most diplomatic missions have remained in Tel Aviv because a shift to Jerusalem would indicate the acceptance
of Israel’s establishment there of its seat of government, which most governments not been keen to do so far.99 Another notable exception is Vatican City
which, due to its small size, cannot fit in the diplomatic missions of the various
sending states and thus, those are located in Rome based on an agreement with
the Government of Italy.100 However, these cases are different from that of the
United States re-locating its embassy to Jerusalem because of “the disputed
status of the city of Jerusalem making it arguably located beyond the territory
of Israel.”101
Article 12 of the VCDR, 1961 requires that “[t]he sending State may not,
without the prior express consent of the receiving State, establish offices
forming part of the mission in localities other than those in which the mission
96
If a state on a voluntary basis, by a unilateral declaration has communicated to the ICJ
under 36(2) that it accepts the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory ipso facto and without any special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Court can be established for bringing a
case against that state. However, in practice, this jurisdiction is also limited as states make
declarations under terms and conditions which are solely determined by themselves. See
Stanimir A. Alexandrov, The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: How Compulsory Is It?, 5 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 29 (2006).
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itself is established.”102 However, this Article does not seem to be directly
applicable in this case.103 In other words, Article 12 seems to apply to those
situations “when a sending state would want to establish its mission in a locality in which the receiving state [objects to] allow such an establishment.”104
Clearly, the United States embassy in Jerusalem has been based on an agreement between the sending and receiving state, i.e. the United States and Israel.
Another issue about VCDR is its Article 3 states that the functions of a
diplomatic mission consist, inter alia, in:
(a) Representing the sending State in the receiving State; (b)
Protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending
State and of its nationals, within the limits permitted by international law … (d) Ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving State, and reporting
thereon to the Government of the sending State (e) Promoting
friendly relations between the sending State and the receiving
State, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific
relations.105
The words “in the receiving state” in four of the five clauses in Article 3
may connote that the drafters of the VCDR perceived a nexus between the
diplomatic mission and the territory of the receiving state. In this case, the
capacity of Israel to give this consent itself is undecided due to the disputed
status of the city of Jerusalem. But having said that, for sure, the United States’
relocation of its embassy to Jerusalem gives recognition to the Israeli claim
and thus, is at odds with the extensive international recognition of Jerusalem
as a disputed territory.106 Indeed, until President Trump’s declaration on December 6, 2017, the United States had always acknowledged that no state had
sovereignty over Jerusalem.107 Thus, by moving its embassy to Jerusalem, by
its own position, the United States has established its diplomatic mission in
Israel in a territory which is under international law, not Israel’s territory.
Thus, the special status of Jerusalem ”established as a corpus separatum under a special international regime” set up by the General Assembly
Resolution no. 181(II) of November 29, 1947 creates a moratorium until Israelis and Palestinians agree.108 Therefore, the territorial situation creates erga
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omnes obligations, which differ from most of the generally bilateral in nature
VCDR obligations. Beyond the U.N. resolutions, Israel recognized the special
status of Jerusalem when it applied for U.N. membership. Mr. Eban, the Israeli
representative, stated:
The question of sovereignty over the area [Jerusalem] has not
yet been finally settled and will be settled, perhaps, at the
fourth session of the General Assembly. It will not be for the
Government of Israel alone to determine that issue of sovereignty. All we can do—and even then only if we are Members
of the United Nations—will be to propose formally certain solutions of our own.109
It is well-established that a unilateral declaration by a state can create international legal obligations towards other states, as established by the PCIJ
in Eastern Greenland.110 In the Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ followed its predecessor’s approach and went a step further observing:
It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the
effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind
may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the intention
of the State making the declaration that it should become
bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State being
thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if
given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though
not made within the context of international negotiations, is
binding.111
Thus, it seems that Israel’s own acknowledgement about the contested status of Jerusalem could help Palestine’s claim about the disputed status of Jerusalem. This would, in turn, mean that absent an authoritative declaration by
the U.N., neither Israel nor Palestine can claim their sovereignty over Jerusalem. Beyond the General Assembly Resolution and Israel’s acknowledgement
of the special status of Jerusalem, the same was recognized by the ICJ in its
advisory opinion in the Wall Case, as the Court categorically stated “the Court
109
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. 47th mtg. of the Ad Hoc Political Committee at 272-78, U.N.
Doc A/AC.24/SR.47 (May 6, 1949).
110
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is of the view that all States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal
situation resulting from the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem.”112
It can be said that whether or not the United States’ declaration amounts
to a violation of Article 41(2) of the 2001 International Law Commission’s
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts (Draft Articles)113 may well become a central substantive issue before
the ICJ.114 This Article states that “[n]o State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach . . . nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.”115 According to Article 40 of the Draft Articles, the serious
breach would be “obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law.”116 If Israel’s 1967 obtaining of control over East Jerusalem
and the subsequent expansion of municipal boundaries is an annexation, then
the recognition of that wrongful annexation may itself amount to a serious
breach of international law. If this Israeli action is treated as an annexation,
then there is a convincing basis for treating the United States’ action as inconsistent with Article 41(2) of the Draft Articles.117
Another point which may lend significant force to Palestine’s case on this
particular point is the UN Security Council Resolutions 476 and 478 of
1980.118 Resolution 476 “[r]eiterates that all such measures which have altered the geographic, demographic and historical character and status of the
Holy City of Jerusalem are null and void and must be rescinded in compliance
with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.”119 Resolution 478 declared that Israel’s claim through a law passed by the Knesset in declaring
Jerusalem, complete and united, as the capital of Israel violated international
law.120 Before the adoption of Resolution 478, Chile, Ecuador, and Venezuela
had announced their decision to withdraw their respective diplomatic missions
from Jerusalem.121 At the time of passing Resolution 478, ten states—Bolivia,
Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Haiti, the Netherlands, Panama and Uruguay—had their missions in Jerusalem. Between August 22 and September 9, all of these States appraised the
112
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UN Secretary-General that they decided to withdraw their mission from the
city.122 And this resolution has fostered a process of the quite consistent collective international non-recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.123
VII. THE RIGHT OF THIRD PARTY (ISRAEL)
Another formidable barrier to the jurisdiction of the ICJ in this case could
be the Monetary Gold principle, as propounded in the Monetary Gold Case
decided by the ICJ in 1954.124 As a matter of jurisprudence, the core issue
before the ICJ was whether it had the third party jurisdiction to settle a legal
dispute between Italy and Albania over assets belonging to Italy that Albania
expropriated.125 In 1925, Italian financiers and the Albanian monarchial government agreed to set up a Banking arrangement which established the National Bank of Albania (NBA).126 As per the arrangement, the NBA would
have the exclusive rights to issue bank notes in Albania which were to be
backed up by gold reserves physically stored in Rome.127 Eventually, by September 16, 1943, the Italian government became the owner of 88.5% of the
total share capital of NBA, which included its gold reserve in Rome.128 That
same day, the German Nazi forces seized around 2,339 kilograms of this gold
reserve and took it to Germany.129 After the German surrender in 1945, Part
III of the Final Act Regarding Reparations after World War II provided that
monetary gold would be “pooled for distribution … in proportion to [a country’s] respective losses of gold through looting or wrongful removal to Germany.”130 It designated France, the United Kingdom, and the United States to
be responsible for ensuring equitable distribution of the monetary gold.131
An arbitration held under the Final Act decided that the gold seized from
the vault of the NBA belonged to Albania.132 But in the meantime, the newly
122
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formed government of Albania on January 13, 1945 nationalized the NBA and
seized all its assets including the gold looted by Nazis.133 However, Albania
did not compensate Italy for the expropriation.134 Again, the U.K. also claimed
this gold as partial satisfaction for Albania’s refusal to pay compensation as
per the ICJ’s judgment in Corfu Channel Case.135 Both Italy and the U.K.
claimed compensation from Albania, but Albania’s shares in the NBA were
not enough to satisfy both.136 A Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of
Monetary Gold (involving France, the U.K., and the United States) decided
that, should Italy fail to apply to the ICJ on the priority between these two
competing claims, the gold would be given to the U.K.137
In May 1953, Italy filed a case before the ICJ claiming priority over the
U.K.138 Italy’s first submission was that France, the UK, and the United States
“should deliver to Italy any share of the monetary gold that might be due to
Albania under Part III of the Paris Act of January 14th, 1946, in partial satisfaction for the damage caused to Italy.”139 Rather remarkably, Italy then questioned the jurisdiction of the ICJ to settle this preliminary question.140 In its
judgment, the ICJ decided that since Albania had not consented to the jurisdiction of the Court, it could not decide a question between Albania and Italy.141 The ICJ reasoned that “[t]o adjudicate upon the international responsibility of Albania without her consent would run counter to a well-established
principle of international law embodied in the Court’s Statute, namely, that
the Court can only exercise jurisdiction over a State with its consent.”142 This
principle was followed by the ICJ in the East Timor Case.143
However, the Monetary Gold principle may only apply if the ICJ decides
that the judgment would involve the rights of Israel. If the relocation of the
U.S. embassy is taken as a decision made by the U.S. administration, then the
Monetary Gold principle may not apply in this case. Technically speaking,
Palestine has not sought to make any claim against Israel; its intended remedy
is sought against the United States only.144 At most, the Palestinian’s case
133
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involves an issue which entails the legality of an action involving Israel. Indeed, the ICJ may hold that the legality of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel
and the relocation of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem are two distinct issues. In
other words, the violation of an international legal obligation by Israel and the
acceptance of that violation by the United States are related but distinct issues.
Should the ICJ take this direction, then the ICJ may decide on the case notwithstanding the Monetary Gold principle.
One commentator has argued somewhat along this line and suggested that
in Palestine’s case the principle may be interpreted narrowly, and thus the ICJ
may find jurisdiction.145 The argument goes that “the Monetary Gold principle
is not about affecting the legal interests of the third State, but about protecting
its rights and obligations from international adjudication without its consent.”146 The support for this restrictive reading of Monetary Gold is sought
from the following passage of the ICJ’s judgement in East Timor case that
“[t]he Court emphasizes that it is not necessarily prevented from adjudicating
when the judgment it is asked to give might affect the legal interests of a State
which is not a party to the case.”147 The Court would refrain from exercising
jurisdiction when the third state’s “rights and obligations would thus constitute the very subject-matter of such a judgment made in the absence of that
State’s consent.”148
The Nauru Case149 may also give us some idea about the application or
otherwise of the Monetary Gold principle. There, Nauru alleged that Australia
unlawfully exploited its natural resources while working as the joint administering authority (along with New Zealand and the United Kingdom) under a
mandate of the League of Nations and then a trusteeship by the United Nations.150 Australia pleaded that without determining the responsibilities of
the United States Embassy in Israel is in breach of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
. . . The State of Palestine further requests the Court to order the United
States of America to withdraw the diplomatic mission from the Holy City
of Jerusalem and to conform to the international obligations flowing from
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
. . . In addition, the State of Palestine asks the Court to order the United
States of America to take all necessary steps to comply with its obligations, to refrain from taking any future measures that would violate its
obligations and to provide assurances and guarantees of non-repetition
of its unlawful conduct.
145
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New Zealand and the United Kingdom—neither of which were parties to the
case—the Court could not decide the matter.151 The Court distinguished this
from the Monetary Gold principle by observing that the determination of Albania’s responsibility was a precondition deciding on Italy’s claims, but here
the determination of the responsibility of the two other parties was not a prerequisite for determining Australia’s responsibility.152 The Court accepted that
the finding, in this case, could have implications for other parties, but the
Court would not have to dwell on that situation and therefore, it felt obliged
to exercise jurisdiction.153 The Court also pointed to the text of Article 59 of
the ICJ Statute to underscored that any finding of the Court would not bind a
non-party to the case before it.154
By analogy, it may be surmised that if the Court decides on the merits of
Palestine’s claim, obviously, that would have implications for Israel, but the
judgment would only bind the parties to the case. Hence, the Monetary Gold
principle may not preclude the Court from exercising jurisdiction. To clarify,
should the Court decide that the relocation of the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem
is illegal, it would only create an obligation on the United States to relocate it,
not Israel because the relocation can be done by the U.S. alone. It is plausible
to argue that the relocation of the U.S. embassy is a decision of the U.S.’s
administration, and although undeniably it would have an effect on Israel, to
determine the legality of Israel’s action is not directly at issue in this case.
That being said, much could hinge on whether the ICJ designates Jerusalem
as a contested territory or not. If the ICJ decides that Jerusalem is a disputed
territory, then the Monetary Gold principle seems much easier to get around
for the Court.
There is an argument that since the ICJ did not refer to Monetary Gold in
Marshall Islands Nuclear Disarmament155, then the ICJ may similarly ignore
the principle in Palestine’s case. 156 However, too much should not be read
from that judgment because the Court in the Marshall Islands decided that it
did not have to decide on jurisdiction because there was an absence of dispute.157 Hence, it would appear that the Court did not have to dwell on the
Monetary Gold principle to arrive at its finding and so the judgement does not
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enlighten us as to how the Court would apply the principle in the case at hand
here.
VIII. THE JUSTICIABILITY OF POLITICAL QUESTIONS
It is quite likely that though the case may be intrinsically linked with political ramifications, this would not in itself deter the Court to shy away from
exercising jurisdiction. The jurisprudence on this point is more or less settled
that simply because a case before the Court has political aspects linked to it,
the Court would not deem it unable to deal with the matter, as long as the case
poses legal questions.158 This is backed up by sound policy reasons too. States
are political entities and it is quite common that legal disputes between states
would involve political questions in one form or the other.159 Hence, too much
sensitivity about political questions may render the Court virtually ineffectual.
The law on this point can be found in the following words in the Kosovo Opinion:
[T]he Court has repeatedly stated that the fact that a question
has political aspects does not suffice to deprive it of its character as a legal question . . . . Whatever its political aspects, the
Court cannot refuse to respond to the legal elements of a question which invites it to discharge an essentially judicial task,
namely, in the present case, an assessment of an act by reference to international law. The Court has also made clear that,
in determining the jurisdictional issue of whether it is confronted with a legal question, it is not concerned with the political nature of the motives which may have inspired the request or the political implications which its opinion might
have.160
A similar finding was made in the Construction of a Wall when the ICJ
stated that “the circumstance that others may evaluate and interpret these facts
in a subjective or political manner can be no argument for a court of law to
abdicate its judicial task.”161 Thus, as long as the Court finds that there is a
legal dispute, the political sensitivity alone would not bar the Court from proceeding with the case. The same principle has been upheld in the context of
158
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contentious cases too. In Nicaragua, when the United States challenged the
jurisdiction of the Court arguing that the Case involved political questions,
the Court, reiterating its finding in United States Diplomatic and Consular
Staff in Tehran, rejected the United States’ argument and observed, “[N]ever
has the view been put forward before that, because a legal dispute submitted
to the Court is only one aspect of a political dispute, the Court should decline
to resolve for the parties the legal questions at issue between them.”162
The jurisprudence on this is also consistently applied in Border and Transborder Armed Actions where the Court observed:
[T]he Court is aware that political aspects may be present in
any legal dispute brought before it. The Court, as a judicial
organ, is however only concerned to establish, first, that the
dispute before it is a legal dispute, in the sense of a dispute
capable of being settled by the application of principles and
rules of international law, and secondly, that the Court has jurisdiction to deal with it, and that that jurisdiction is not fettered by any circumstance rendering the application inadmissible. The purpose of recourse to the Court is the peaceful
settlement of such disputes; the Court’s judgment is a legal
pronouncement, and it cannot concern itself with the political
motivation which may lead a State at a particular time, or in
particular circumstances, to choose judicial settlement.163
IX. CONCLUSION
How the ICJ would handle the case is a matter of conjecture at this stage.
While some issues such as the justiciability of political questions are relatively
settled jurisprudence, some others such as the statehood of Palestine or its
locus standi are more uncertain. However, some points may be made with
some degree of certainty. Should the Court find that it has jurisdiction in this
case and proceeds to hear the case on its merits, that in itself may lead to legal
answers to some questions which may then have some degree of impact on
resuscitating the peace process in the Middle East. From a realpolitik point of
view, if the ICJ only decides that Palestine is a state and then because of the
Monetary Gold principle or some other reason goes on to hold that it lacks
jurisdiction to proceed to the merits, that could mean the end of the case, but
162
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still a significant political status boost for Palestine. However, if the Court
takes up the highly debated issue of Palestinian statehood, it is unlikely that it
would shy away from proceeding with a more jurisprudential issue such as
the Monetary Gold principle.
Without the advantage of a crystal ball or hindsight, it may be said that
should the ICJ decide that it has jurisdiction to proceed to hear the case on
merit (by pronouncing on the statehood of Palestine or not), the Monetary
Gold principle or the violation of VCDR as such may not prove to be an insurmountable barrier for giving its judgement on the merits of the case. Additionally, because of the complex questions this case poses, any judgment by
the Court beyond the preliminary issue of admissibility of the case would
likely be read and re-read by readers of international law for quite some time.
It is somewhat paradoxical that while on merit Palestine seems to have a rather
good case, on a jurisdictional level, it has to surmount many challenges which
may stand in the way of it going that far. This is perhaps more a reflection of
the consent-centric nature of international law than anything to do with this
case per se.

